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APPENDIX I
Reprinted with permission from The Record of The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, © 1999. 54 The Record 712

THE NEW FEDERALISM
A Report of the Committee on Federal Legislatibn
Association of the Bar of the City of New York

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1994-95 Supreme Court Term, the Court has held twenty
separate federal laws unconstitutional. This rate is unprecedented in
our history. The Supreme Court has nullified a total of 150 acts of
Congress on constitutional grounds since Marbury v. Madison, I
Cranch 137 (1803), an average of slightly less than one act per year.
The recent trend of striking down an average of four statutes each
year is exceptional and deserves the attention of the legal profession
and other branches of government.
In annulling these federal laws, the Court has applied new
standards for examining legislation passed by Congress. While it is
not unusual for the Court to hold that a particular law violates the
First Amendment or the equal protection or separation of powers
doctrines, it was previously quite rare for the Court to hold that
Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause, as the
Court did in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Indeed,
before Lopez, the Court had not struck down a federal law on that
basis since 1936. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
In the Term after Lopez, 1995-96, the Court held in Seminole
Tribe of Floridav. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) that the Commerce
Clause did not give Congress the power to override the State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Congress, the Court said, could
only overcome the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States by
exercising its power under the Fourteenth Amendment and only by
expressing an unequivocal intent to do so.
More recently, the Court greatly expanded the Tenth Amendment
in Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997). In Printz, the
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Court struck down provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act that required state law enforcement officials to
perform background checks on handgun purchasers for an interim
period before a federal computer system could be established. The
Court held that the federal government may not enlist state officials
to carry out federal policies. Printz calls into question many federal
laws that impose minimum burdens on state officials to supply
information to, or cooperate with, the federal government.
AfterQtrintz, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
Court held that Congress could not, by exercising its powers under
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, expand individual rights beyond
the limits established by the Supreme Court in interpreting that
Amendment. That decision goes against a long line of decisions by
the Court that had interpreted Section 5 as the equivalent of the
"necessary and proper clause" in Article 1, Section 8. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966):
By including Section 5, the draftsman sought to grant to
Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
In its most recent Term, 1998-99, the Court expanded the
federalist rulings noted above still further. In Alden v. Maine, 119
S.Ct. 2240 (1999), the Court held that those provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act that expanded the protection of that law to state
employees, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), and that required the States to pay
overtime to their employees, could not be enforced in either state or
federal court. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999),
the Court struck down the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15
U.S.C. §1122, which extended the protections of the federal
Lanham Act to the States, holding that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited any such suit in federal court. And in the companion case
of Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999) the Court came to a
similar conclusion which respect to the Patent Remedy Act, 35
U.S.C. §271(h) and 296(a), which made the States amenable to suits
for patent infringement in federal court.
These decisions have created considerable concern that the Court
has imposed impractical and inappropriate limitations on the power
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of Congress to legislate in the national interest. The theme of all of
the decisions is a new view of federalism in which the power of the
federal government vis-a-vis the States is'constitutionally limited to a
degree unprecedented in modern times. The Court explained the
principle in PFrintz:
It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of
"dual sovereignty." ... Although the States surrendered
many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they
retained "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The
Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison). This is reflected
throughout the Constitution's text,...... Residual state
sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's
conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but
only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication
was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's assertion
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
117 S.Ct. at 2376-77.
The lower federal courts have recognized this trend, and some
have stretched and expanded the concept of states' rights to an
unprecedented degree. The discussion in some recent cases is
reminiscent of the early debates between the Federalists and AntiFederalists over ratification of the Constitution. The Fourth Circuit
began its recent opinion invalidating the Violence against Women
Act - a law protecting women from violence, sponsored in part by
Senators Hatch and Dole and passed by large majorities in both
Houses of Congress in 1994 - with the following exhortation:
We the People, distrustful of power, and believing that
government limited and dispersed protects freedom best,
provided that our federal government would be one of
enumerated powers, and that all power unenumerated would
be reserved to the several States and to ourselves. Thus,
though the authority conferred upon the federal government be
broad, it is an authority constrained by no less a power than
that of the People themselves. "[Tihat these limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). These
simple truths of power bestowed and power withheld under
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the Constitution have never been more relevant than in this
day, when accretion, if not actual accession, of power to the
federal government seems not only unavoidable, but even
expedient.
Brzonkala v. Virginia, 169 F.3d 820, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1999)(en
bane).
Simlarly, lower federal courts have applied the new federalism to
strike down numerous federal statutes, whose validity had never
been questioned before. Besides the Violence Against Women Act,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Drivers Privacy Protection Act were held
invalid as applied to the States. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in
Florida Prepaid, identified a number of other laws that were
vulnerable, based on the reasoning in that case -- including the
Family and Medical Leave Act and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. See 119 S.Ct.at 2219 fn 18. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
The Committee on Federal Legislation is greatly concerned that the
New Federalism developed by the Supreme Court and expanded by
the lower federal courts is both inappropriate and dangerous.
First, the formalistic rules established by the Supreme Court are
anti-majoritarian in the extreme. The decisions discussed in detail
below make it more difficult for the national Congress -- surely
expressing the desires and wishes of "We the People" -- to address
problems of national dimension on a national basis. The New
Federalism decisions focus primarily on those provisions of the
Constitution intended to preserve the theoretical separation of the
States in the constitutional scheme and protect them from
encroachment by the central federal government. These concerns
had some force at the founding of the republic, when a strong
central government was viewed as a danger to liberty. We believe
that the Court's resurrection of these doctrines at the threshhold of
the 21 st Century is anachronistic at best.
Second, the States do not need the assistance of the United States
Supreme Court to protect their independence. The Court's fear that
the States' separateness will be overwhelmed or undermined by
federal legislation and that they will become mere provinces in the
European model subject to direct central control is unrealistic in the
extreme. The Constitution affords the states ample power to protect
their separateness in a number of ways: the Senate consists of two
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senators from each state regardless of population. The Electoral
College guarantees that any candidate for President must deal with
the political power of each State separately. The States establish
both the qualifications of voters and the electoral lines of legislative
districts for the House of Representatives. We disagree with the
view that the States need further protection from the United States
Supreme Court, applying the vague phrases of the Tenth
Amendment or some general idea of proper "structure" between the
states and the federal government.
We believe that it is very undesirable to impose dramatic new
restrictions on Congress' power to legislate in the national interest.
The New Federalism adds to the already difficult process of
marshalling political and legislative support for initiatives that must
occur on a national level. We reject the notion that Congress, which
represents the concerns of the entire nation, cannot ask for State
cooperation on national policies, such as protecting the environment,
and cannot make the States amenable to protective or antidiscriminatory legislation in dealing with its own employees. We are
not dealing with theoretical problems of an Eighteenth Century rural
society where the greatest danger to freedom seemed to be a national
government with a standing army. We should not interpret the
Constitution as if that were the chief threat facing our government
today.
This report will examine each of the relevant recent Supreme
Court decisions and suggest ways in which Congress, in passing
future legislation, may satisfy the Supreme Court's concerns about
federalism. We believe that Congress should make its purpose clear
in passing protective federal legislation affecting state employees or
requesting state aid in carrying out federal policies. In addition, in
exercising its power of the purse, it may condition the grant of
federal funds to the States upon their compliance with federal
policies designed to resolve national problems on a national basis.
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II. COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS AFTER LOPEZ
Lopez appeared, initially, to impose the most severe restrictions on
Congress. In practice, however, the lower federal courts have
generallycnot 6xpanded the -uling, which. appears to present serious
challenges to few federal laws, with one notable exception from the
Fourth Circuit. Congress itself easily corrected the defect the Court
identified in Lopez. The Court gave Congress considerable leeway in
relying on the Commerce Clause, and the case no longer seems a
serious barrier to legislation.
A. The holding in Lopez.
The Supreme Court in Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which forbids "any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows ... is a school zone," 18

U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). The Court held in a five-to-four decision
that the law was explicitly based upon Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause. The Court returned to what it called "first
principles" of our Constitutional scheme, under which the police
power of the States was virtually unlimited (unless specifically
prohibited by some Constitutional limitation) while the powers of the
federal government "are few and defined."
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8.
As James Madison wrote, "The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite." The Federalist No. 45, pp.
292?293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
This constitutionally
mandated division of authority "was adopted by the Framers
to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."
Although the Court acknowledged that its modem precedents had
significantly expanded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
to permit it to deal with national problems, there remained
limitations on that power:
But even these modem-era precedents which have expanded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that
this power is subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin
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Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate
commerce power "must be considered in the light of our dual
system of government and may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government." 301 U.S., at 37, 57 S.Ct., at 624.
514 U.S. at 556-57.
To support a Congressional enactment under the clause, one of
three conditions had to be met. The Court explained:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities.... Finally, Congress'
commerce
authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.... i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
514 U.S. at 558-59.
Congress has broad power to regulate the "channels of interstate
commerce," (e.g., railroads, wire communications, the mail) and to
"protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce," e.g., guns or drugs that have moved
in interstate commerce. But with respect to the last category, where
an interstate facility is not involved and no "person or thing" has
moved in interstate commerce, three requirements must be met: (1)
the activity that is regulated must involve or affect commerce in the
strictest sense, that is, "economic enterprise" or activity; (2) the
activity regulated by the federal law must "substantially affect"
interstate commerce; (3) the Court will not simply accept Congress'
say-so that the required effect exists.
We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens
that an activity has on interstate omerce.... But to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate
the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no
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such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here.
514 U.S. at 562-63.
The Court rejected the government's argument that crime has an
affect on interstate commerce and that .guns in school zones will
ultimately impact on the nation's economic activities, noting:
Under the theories that the Government presents in support of
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, eIn' -in -areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign.
Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.
514 U.S. at 564.
The Court thereby redefined federalism, finding the general power
to legislate for the public good should remain in the hands of the
States, and that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress
to legislate in every area of national life.
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have
to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long
steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional
action ....

The

broad

language

in

these

opinions

has

suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we
decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require
us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers
does not presuppose something not enumerated,...

and that

there never will be a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local.... This we are unwilling to do.

514 U.S. at 567-68.
B. Lower Court interpretation of Lopez.
The decision in Lopez precipitated challenges against dozens of
federal laws. The constitutionality of the Violence against Women
Act (VAWA) (42 U.S.C. § 13981 et seq.) under Lopez has been
debated in many cases, see, e.g., United States v. Page, 136 F.3d
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481 (6th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d 49 (2d
Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit, however, is the only circuit to apply
the reasoning of Lopez to invalidate the' VAWA. See Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)(en
banc)(holding that criminal violence based on gender did not involve
commercial activity and that ultimate impact of violence against
women on the movement of goods and services across state lines did
not create sufficient interstate nexus under Lopez). The validity of
the Child Support Recovery Act (18 U.S.C. §228) was upheld in
United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997) and United
States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
Federal courts have also had to deal with Lopez challenges to the
Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. §1951), see United States v. Guerra, 164
F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999); the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act
(FACE), see Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997) and
United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 1998); the federal
drug trafficking statute (21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1)), see United States v.
Patterson, 140 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1998); the federal child
pornography statute (18 U.S.C. §2252), see United States v.
Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998) and United States v.
Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 1998); the federal arson statute
(18 U.S.C. §844(i)), see United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116 (2d
Cir. 1998); the firearm possession law, (18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)), see
United States v. Crawford, 130 F.3d 1321 (8th Cir. 1997); the
domestic violence gun possession law, (18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8)), see
United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1998);
contraband cigarette trafficking law, (18 U.S.C. §2341-46), see
United States v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897 (6th Cir. 1998); the federal
car-jacking law (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and sentencing factors under the
law, see United States v. Rivera-Figueroa, 149 F.3d 1 (lst Cir.
1998); United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998) and
United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995), appeal after
remand, 116 F.3d 1487 (9th Cir. 1997).
The lower courts have had no difficulty in concluding that even
without a specifically articulated interstate nexus, laws against
arson, the possession of a machine gun, devices of mass destruction
or possession of explosives has a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce. See generally United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320 (6th
Cir. 1997)(arson statute), United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90
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(2d Cir. 1998)(machine gun possession), United States v. Viscome,
144 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 1998)(possession of weapons of mass
destruction), and United States v. Dascenzo, 152 F.3d 1300 (11th
Cir. 1998)(possession of explosives).
Rarely has a lower federal court upheld a challenge under Lopez to
a federal law. H4bwever, the Fourth Circuit held that regulations
issued under the Clean Water Act, which extended federal legal
protection to certain wetlands, exceeded Congressional power under
the Commerce Flause,. see -United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251
(4th Cir. 1997). It has also recently held that the VAWA was
unconstitutional since there was no showing that violence against
women had a substantial effect on commercial activity between the
states. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820
(4th Cir. 1999)(en banc). Prompt review of that decision in the
Supreme Court is being sought by the government.
In addition, one district court has held that the Child Support
Recovery Act (18 U.S.C. §228), criminalizing a parent's failure to
make child support payments when the parent and child live in
different states, was unconstitutional, see United States v.
Schroeder, 894 F.Supp 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), but that decision was
reversed on appeal, United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir.
1996).
The overwhelming number of cases treat the limitations established
by Lopez as a minor problem, easily correctable through the devices
mentioned below. So long as Congress relies upon regulating the
"channels" of interstate commerce or "persons or things" moving
in interstate commerce as the basis for legislation, Lopez should not
pose an impediment.
C. Congressional Response After Lopez.
Shortly after the decision in Lopez, Congress amended the Gun
Free School Zones Act to correct the defect noted by the Supreme
Court. In P.L. 104-294, Congress added the underlined twelve
words to the law to create the missing interstate nexus: "It shall be
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has
moved in or that otherwise affects interstate orforeign commerce at
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A). Since the new law
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specifically relies for federal jurisdiction upon a "thing" (the gun)
that moved in interstate commerce, the deficiency noted in Lopez
was corrected.
Thus, so long as Congress relies on the first two bases for its
commerce clause legislation - regulating a "channel" of interstate
commerce or regulating or protecting a "person or thing" that
moved in interstate commerce, Lopez is not a problem.
Even if there is no explicit interstate nexus, Congress can make
specific legislative fact-findings to demonstrate the "substantial
effect" on economic activity required for the third prong of Lopez.
In the future, the case should not create a serious bar to the exercise
of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
LII.

STATE IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL SUIT UNDER THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.

The most serious obstacle to the exercise of Congressional power
is Seminole Tribe. The Supreme Court expanded the rationale of that
decision in three cases decided in the 1998-99 Term, mentioned
above, Alden, Florida Prepaid, and College Savings Bank. Lower
federal courts found that Congress lacked the power after Seminole,
Tribe to expand federal court jurisdiction over the States in many
separate instances, involving such important federal laws as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. As noted above, in his dissent in FloridaPrepaid,
Justice Stevens identified six separate federal laws that were also
susceptible based on Seminole Tribe.
A. Seminole Tribe, Alden and FloridaPrepaid.
The Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe that Congress could not
rely upon its commerce clause power to overcome a State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity, even if Congress made its intent and purpose
unequivocally clear. In a five-to-four decision (involving the same
majority as in Lopez), the Court struck down a provision of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that permitted a federal court
action against a state to compel state officials to negotiate with an
Indian tribe with respect to a gambling compact. The IGRA allows
an Indian tribe to conduct certain gaming activities only in
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conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in
which the gaming activities are located. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
Under the Act, States have a duty to negotiate in good faith with a
tribe toward the formation of a compact, § 2710(d)(3)(A), and a
tribe may sue a State in federal court in order to compel
performance of that duty, § 2710(d)(7). 'Florida refused to negotiate
with the Seminole Tribe, and suit was then brought by the Seminoles
in federal court to compel the State to engage in the required
negotiations.
Striking down that provision of the IGRA that permitted a federal
court action to compel the state to negotiate, the Court noted that
there were two requirements for Congress to abrogate a State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity: First, Congress must unequivocally
express its intent to do so and second, it must act "pursuant to a
valid exercise of power." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
(1985).
In this instance, through the numerous references to the "State" in
§ 2710(d)(7)(B)'s text, Congress provided an "unmistakably clear"
statement of its intent to abrogate.
With respect to the second condition, the Court had to decide
whether the law was passed pursuant to a constitutional provision
granting Congress such power. The Court had previously held that
Congress could rely upon its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to overrule a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In a later
split decision, the Court held that Congress could also rely upon the
Commerce Clause to overrule a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). The
Union Gas plurality found "that Congress' power to abrogate came
from the States' cession of their sovereignty when they gave
Congress plenary power to regulate commerce, and thus the States
had "consented" to the waiver of their 11 th Amendment immunity.
Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas and held that Congress could
not rely upon the Commerce Clause to make States amenable to
federal court jurisdiction.
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the
background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate
when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of
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Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the
Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete law-making authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power
under Article HI, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.
Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida must be dismissed
for a lack of jurisdiction.
517 U.S. at 72-73.
The Supreme Court read even more federalism dictates into the
Eleventh Amendment in Alden v. Maine. That case was originally
brought by certain probation officers from the State of Maine, who
sued for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. After the
Seminole Tribe decision, the First Circuit dismissed the case,
holding that since the FLSA was passed pursuant to Congress'
Commerce Clause power, the State could now raise an Eleventh
Amendment defense. See Mills v. State of Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (lst
Cir. 1997).
The plaintiff in Mills then moved his case for overtime pay to state
court, relying on a long line of Supreme Court cases holding that the
Eleventh Amendment was not a defense to a suit against a State
brought in state court: " ...

the Eleventh Amendment does not

apply in state courts," Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U. S. 58, 63?64 (1989). Nevetheless, the Maine Supreme Court
held that Congress could not require the states to entertain federal
causes of action that could not be brought in federal court because of
the Eleventh Amendment, see Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me.
1998), affirmed, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999).
The Supreme Court, in yet another five-to-four decision written by
Justice Kennedy, held that even though the Eleventh Amendment by
its own terms prohibited suits against the States in federal court, the
Amendment embodies a broader sovereign immunity doctrine which
protects the States from federal suits in their own courts.
We have ... sometimes referred to the States' immunity from

suit as "Eleventh Amendment immunity." The phrase is
convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is
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limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as
the Constitution's structure, and its history, and the
authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the
States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of
the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally
or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal
footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of
- the Convention -or certain constitutional Amendments.
119 S.Ct. at 2246.
Examining the history of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
immunity cases, Justice Kennedy noted:
These holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding,
consistent with the views of the leading advocates of the
Constitution's ratification, that sovereign immunity derives not
from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the
original Constitution itself.
Id. at 2254.
The Court examined in great detail the historical background to
State sovereign immunity, Congressional practice and court
decisions interpreting the concept. Based on this broader
interpretation of the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
held that Congress lacked the power to abrogate State sovereign
immunity in its own courts.

In some ways, of course, a congressional power to authorize
private suits against non consenting States in their own courts
would be even more offensive to state sovereignty than a
power to authorize the suits in a federal forum ..... A power
to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the
other branches of the State, furthermore, is the power first to
turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the
entire political machinery of the State against its will and at
the behest of individuals.

.

. Such plenary federal control of

state governmental processes denigrates the separate
sovereignty of the States.
The Court concluded:
In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the
Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from
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private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.
In the two other five-to-four Eleventh Amendment decisions
decided in the 1998-99 Term, College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. 2219
(1999) and FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducationExpense Board
v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999), the Court struck
down the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C. §1122,
and the Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. §271(h) and 296(a), which
made the States amenable to suit for trademark and patent
infringement in federal court.
In the trademark case, the Court held that the State of Florida had
not impliedly or constructively waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by engaging in commercial activity that fell within the
Trademark Remedy Act. The Court overruled the Parden doctrine
(Parden v. Terminal R. Co. of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184
(1964)), under which a State may constructively waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by engaging in activity that Congress warned
could lead to a federal suit. Pardenhad held:
By enacting the [FELA] ... Congress conditioned the right to
operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to
suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter
operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be
taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have
consented to suit.
377 U. S., at 192.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court rejected the principle of
"constructive waiver":
We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden
was ill-conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage
any remnant of it. As we explain below in detail, Parden
broke sharply with prior cases, and is fundamentally
incompatible with later ones. We have never applied the
holding of Parden to another statute, and in fact have
narrowed the case in every subsequent opinion in which it has
been under consideration. In short, Parden stands as an
anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and
indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutional law. Today, we
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drop the other shoe: Whatever may remain of our decision in
Parden is expressly overruled.
In the companion patent case, the Court examined the question
whether Congress had properly exercised its power under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the Patent Remedy Act.
That is, was Congress enforcing the due process clause by making
the States amenable to suit in federal court for patent infringement?
The Court concluded that a patent right was a property right. But it
held -that Congress exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment by passing the law in question, since it was not clearly
established that patent infringement by the States was a pervasive
problem that had to be solved by Congressional exercise of its
Section 5 power. Relying on the narrowing interpretation of
Congressional power under section 5 as described in City of Boerne,
the Court held that Congress had to demonstrate that the law it
passed could be viewed as remedial or preventive legislation aimed
at securing the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for victims
of State actions.
The Court explained:
In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.
Unlike the
undisputed record of racial discrimination confronting
Congress in the voting rights cases, see City of Boerne, supra,
at 525-27, Congress came up with little evidence of infringing
conduct on the part of the States. The House Report
acknowledged that "many states comply with patent law" and
could provide only two examples of patent infringement suits
against the States. See H. R. Rep., at 38. The Federal
Circuit in its opinion identified only eight patent infringement
suits prosecuted against the States in the 110 years between
1880 and 1990.
Even if a deprivation of property rights had occurred, the States
did provide a remedy through their own courts.
Thus, under the plain terms of the Clause and the clear import
of our precedent, a State's infringement of a patent, though
interfering with a patent owner's right to exclude others, does
not by itself violate the Constitution. Instead, only where the
State provides no remedy, or only i mC- luate remedies, to
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injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could
a deprivation of property without due process result.
Since a remedy (such as an eminent domain suit in state court) was
possible, no deprivation could be shown.
B. Lower Court Expansion of Eleventh Amendment.
After 1989, Congress reacted to the Union Gas decision by passing
a series of laws making the States amenable to federal court
jurisdiction. As noted above, Congress amended the Copyright,
Patent and Trademark Laws, specifically granting jurisdiction to
federal courts to hear cases against the States involving infringement
of rights in those areas. See e.g., 17 U.S.C. §511, 35 U.S.C.
§271(h) and §296(a), and 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1) and (2). In
addition, Congress had expanded federal anti-discrimination laws,
particularly in the employment area, and made the States proper
defendants in such suits, in view of the States' significant role as a
major employer.'
Soon after Seminole Tribe, the lower federal courts began to
examine the question of whether the States may be sued in federal
court for violating various anti-discrimination laws passed by,
Congress. As noted above, the Court had held in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) that Congress had properly exercised its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in making the
states amendable to suit under Title VII for discrimination based on
race, gender or national origin.
Lower federal courts applied the same reasoning to uphold the
Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. §206) see Varner v. Illinois State
University, 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998). For the most part,
federal courts have upheld the validity of almost all of the important
anti-discrimination laws such as Title VI, the ADEA and the ADA
as applied to the States. See Cooper v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1998)(ADEA); Magneault v.
Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998)(ADEA); Coger v. Board of
Regents of State of Tenn., 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998)(ADEA);
According to Justice Souter's dissent in Alden, the States collectively
employed 4,732,608 workers in 1997, see fa. 40, approximately 3.5% of the
total civilian work force in the United States.
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Debs v. Northeastern Illinois University, 153 F.3d 390 (7th Cir.
1998)(ADEA); and Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois, 123 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997)(upholding validity of
ADEA as applied to the States); Autio v. AFSCME, 140 F.3d 802
(8th Cir. 1998)(ADA as applied to states was valid exercise of
Congressional power under Section of 14th Amendment); Alsbrook
v. City of Maumelle, 156 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1998)(ADA); Lesage v.
State of Texas, 158 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1998)(Congress had authority
.to abr.gate States'.Eleventh-l1th Amendment -immunity under Title
VI); Anderson v. State University of New York, 169 F.3d 117 (2d
Cir. 1999)(Congress had authority to overrule state's
lth
Amendment immunity in Equal Pay Act); Varner v. Illinois State
University, 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998)(Equal Pay Act).
But some lower federal courts have come to opposite conclusions.
Thus the Eighth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have held that the
ADEA was not properly passed pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and States may assert their Eleventh
Amendment immunity to private suits brought against the states to
enforce that law. See Humenansky v. Regents of the University of
Minnesota, 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998) and Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11 th Cir. 1997) cert. granted,
119 S.Ct.
(January 25, 1999). The Americans with Disabilities
Act was recently declared invalid insofar as it authorized suits
against the states, see Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999)(holding that ADA
regulations prohibiting states from charging handicapped people for
special parking places were unconstitutional) and Kilcullen v. New
York State Department of Transportation, 33 F.Supp.2d 133 (N.D.
N.Y. 1999)(ADA requirefiient of "reasonable accommodation"
placed upon States and permitting suits against States, invalid under
Eleventh Amendment).
The 1998-99 cases read even more force into the Eleventh
Amendment, thus encouraging the States to raise even more
objections to federal law.
C. Legislative Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
As noted, Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity if it makes its intenti n to do so clear, and if
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it acts pursuant to a valid exercise of Constitutional power, such as
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, for example, to the
extent that Congress' intention to overrule a State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity was held to be unclear under the ADEA or
the ADA, Congress could rectify the problem by doing what it tried
to do in the Patent Remedy Act - specifically naming the States as
proper defendants under these Acts.
The Eighth Circuit held in Humenansky that Congress did not
make its intent to overrule a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
"unmistakably clear," as required by Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 232 (1989). Although the 1974 amendments to the ADEA
specifically broadened the definition of an "employer" to include a
"State or a political subdivision of a State," see 29 U.S.C. §630(b),
the Eighth Circuit found that Congress' failure to specifically
mention its intent to overrule a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity or to amend the jurisdictional section of the law
(specifically allowing suits in federal court) did not satisfy the strict
requirements of Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, n. 6. See 152 F.3d
at 825.
In the Eleventh Circuit decision in Kimel, also invalidating the
ADEA's application to the States, one judge (Edmondson) came to
the same conclusion. (A concurring Judge found that age was not a
protected status under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus the law was invalid on that ground since
Congress could enforce the equal protection provisions of Section 1
only with respect to classes found subject to heightened scrutiny.
This was also an alternative holding of the Eighth Circuit in
Humenansky.)
The solution is for Congress to specifically express its intention not
only to make States amenable to suit, but also to express its desire to
overrule the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. For example,
42 U.S.C. §2000d-7 (a)(1) reads as follows: "A State shall not be
immune
under
the
Eleventh
Amendment
of
the
Constitution... from suit in Federal court for a violation of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

.

.

.title IX of the Education

Amendments .... Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by
recipients of Federal financial assistance." This type of provision

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [2000], Art. 7

284

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

would certainly seem to satisfy the "unmistakably clear"
requirement mentioned above.
In addition, if Congress is relying upon Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the basis for overruling a States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, it should say so. The Fifth Circuit panel
decision in Chavez holding that the Copyright Remedy Act was
unconstitutional relied in part on the fact that Congress did not
explicitly cite Section 5 of the 14th Amendment when it passed that
law: "The Cop3yight --Remedy Clarification Act -does not expressly
rely on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ... It may be too

much of a leap to infer Congress' reliance on the Fourteenth
Amendment in the copyright amendments when it did not expressly
state its intent to legislate on that basis." 157 F.3d at 288, n. 8.
Once again, the solution is to cite specifically Section 5 if
Congress wishes to make the States amenable to suit in federal
court. As noted below, City of Boerne also places an additional
burden on Congress to show that its reliance on Section 5 was
remedial and proportionate. In addition, Congress is now required to
make findings that the State action it is remedying involved a
"pattern" of unconstitutional action. See Florida Prepaid: "In
enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no
pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations .... Congress came up with little evidence

of infringing conduct on the part of the States."
Another possible solution, as previously suggested by the Civil
Rights Committee of this Association, was for Congress to condition
federal financial assistance upon a State's waiver of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Under the Supreme Court decision in South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)(a seven-to-two decision
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in which Justice Scalia joined),
Congress may impose conditions on the States pursuant to its
exercise of its Spending Power. Thus Congress could require the
States to surrender their immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
in order to obtain highway funds, crime control expenditures,
medicaid or medicare funds, education funds or even funds under
the Social Security Act. If the States wish to obtain federal funds
under various social welfare provisions, they must accede to the
anti-discrimination laws mentioned above, such as the ADEA and
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ADA, and waive their immunity for suit in federal court.
discussion below at pp. 25-26.
IV.

285
See

THE PRJNTZ DECISION AND TENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY

In yet another five-to-four decision involving the same voting
majority as in Lopez and Seminole Tribe, the Court in Printz held
that the federal government may not enlist state officials to carry out
federal policies. Thus as minor a burden as requiring local sheriffs
to conduct background checks on potential purchasers of handguns
(until a national computer system could be established) violated
2
States' rights under the Tenth Amendment.
A. The Printz Decision
The 1993 amendments to the federal Gun Control Act (the Brady
Bill) required the "chief law enforcement officer" in local
jurisdictions to make background checks on potential purchaser of
handguns, to insure that they did not fall within certain prohibited
categories, such as convicted felons, aliens, dishonorably discharged
veterans or persons adjudicated as mentally defective or committed
to mental institutions. The Act required the Attorney General to
establish a national instant background check system by November
30, 1998, at which time the state officers' obligation to perform
background checks would end.
The interim background check requirement was challenged by
various sheriffs, who claimed that the Tenth Amendment forbade
Congress from enlisting them to carry out the federal policy. The
Supreme Court agreed.
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia examined various early
federal laws which generally placed certain reporting requirements
on state officials to supply information to the federal government
and distinguished them from the requirements of the Brady Bill.

2 The

Association had filed a brief as Amicus curiae in Prinrz urging that the
background check provision be upheld. See "The Brady Bill and the Tenth
Amendment," 52 The Record (March, 1997).
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He then examined the "structure" of the Constitution, which
unequivocally showed that:
using the States as the instruments of federal governance was
both ineffectual and provocative of federal/state conflict. See
.The Federalist No. 15.
Preservation of the States as
independent political entities being the price of union, and
"[t]he practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions,
for the States as political bodies" having been, in Madison's
words, "exploded on all hands," 2 Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, p. 9 (M. Farrand ed. 1911), the Framers
rejected the concept of a central government that would act
upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in
which the state and federal governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people ?? who were, in
Hamilton's words, "the only proper objects of government,"
The Federalist No. 15, at 109.
117 S.Ct. at 2376.
According to Justice Scalia's analysis, "The Constitution thus
contemplates that a State's government will represent and remain
accountable to its own citizens." Id. This structure, the Court
reasoned, was crucial to protect the people's freedom:
This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's
structural protections of liberty. "Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front."
Id. citing Gregory, 111 S.Ct.; at 2400.
Finally, the Court found that the requirements of the Brady Bill
violated the "political accountability" requirements of New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992):
The Government also maintains that requiring state officers to
perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress does
not violate the principle of New York because it does not
diminish the accountability of state or federal officials. This
argument fails even on its own terms. By forcing state
governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take
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credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.
117 S.Ct. at 2382.
B. Application of the Printz Decision
Other courts have applied Pfrintz to cast doubt on the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act as it applies to state
and local government employees. See West v. Anne Arundel County
Maryland, 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Circuit held that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(18 U.S.C. §2721-2725), which broadly prohibited States from
selling motor vehicle records for commercial purposes, was
unconstitutional under Printz, see Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. since Congress was
requiring state officials to carry out a federal policy.
The First Circuit had to deal with the question of whether, after
Printz, an injunction would be issued under the Endangered Species
Act against state officials issuing permits for lobster pot fishing. See
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997). Although the Court
ultimately upheld the injunction against state officials issuing gillnet
permits and lobster pot fishing permits, the Court acknowledged that
Printz had raised serious barriers to federal environmental
requirements against state officials. The Ninth Circuit found the
Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act (16 U.S.C.
§ 620-620j) invalid, Board of National Resources v. Brown, 993
F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir 1993), because of the burden placed on state
officials to carry out a federal environmental policy.
Many other requirements of the federal environmental laws, which
require state coordination and reporting, may be questionable after
Printz. Among the questionable laws are the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 2645, 2647,
requiring governors to develop management plans for dealing with
asbestos in school buildings, and the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §11001,
requiring states to create emergency response commissions. See
generally Jonathan Adler, "The Green Aspects of Printz: The
Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law,"
6 Geo. MASON L. REV. 573 (1998).See also Vicki C. Jackson,

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [2000], Art. 7

288

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

"Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law," 111 HARV. L. REv.
2181, 2205 (1998).
C. Legislative Solution to Printz
The Printz- restriction on Congressional power under the Tenth
Amendment cannot be evaded simply by Congressional expression
of its intent to overturn a State's immunity. Printz and New York
both provide that a State cannot involuntarily be required to carry
out any federal policy.
However, in the same way that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment can be utilized to overrule States' immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, we think it can also be relied upon to serve as
a basis for federal action to prevail against a Tenth Amendment
challenge. See Evan H. Caminker, "Printz, State Sovereignty, and
the Limits of Federalism," 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199, 238 (1997).
Thus so long a Congress has made the proper legislative findings
and has expressed its clear intent to rely on Section 5, the analysis is
the same as with the Eleventh Amendment above.
For example, the States can be obliged to follow the requirements
of the Voting Rights Act and carry out federal policy to insure the
elimination of barriers to voting. Since the Voting Rights Law was
clearly based on the Fourteenth Amendment, Printz does not bar its
enforcement.
Another solution to the problems caused by the Court's reliance on
the Tenth Amendment doctrine may lie in the Spending Power. In
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that Congress may condition receipt of federal funds upon state
compliance with federal requirements if three conditions are met: (1)
the condition must relate "to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs," 483 U.S. at 210; (2) there is no
other constitutional prohibition that independently bars the
conditional grant of funds (such as the "unconstitutional condition"
doctrine), 483 U.S. at 207; (3) the financial inducement must not be
"coercive," 483 U.S. at 211.
States receive a wide variety of federal funds for highway
construction, crime control, medicaid, medicare, education, social
security and other programs. Congress could condition the States'
receipt of such funds upon the States' agreement to carry out certain
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federal policies in the areas for which funds are made available to
the States, such as the Brady gun control act (crime control funds)
or the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (highway funds), the subject
of cases described above. Surely if Congress could require the states
to raise the drinking age to 21 or lose millions of dollars in highway
funds, Congress could also require the States to protect the privacy
of motor vehicle records or lose such funds.
Congressional conditional grant of funds in these areas would
appear to meet the three conditions noted above.3
V.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Another important federalism decision was City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which struck down a very popular
Congressional enactment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In Morgan v. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) the Court had
held that Congress could, through specific legislation, enlarge the
scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights as previously defined by the
Supreme Court. Now the Supreme Court in City of Boerne has cast
doubt on that principle.
A. The Decision in City of Boerne.
In City of Boerne, the Court analyzed the extent of Congressional
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
examined Congress' power to alter the extent of protection of
religious rights through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In a
previous decision, the Court had held in Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) that any
law of general applicability that impacted on free exercise rights
would be measured under a more lenient standard than a
"compelling state interest" test.
Congress was dissatisfied with such a moderate and easily met test.
It quickly passed the RFRA, which required that whenever
3 This is the conclusion reached by most commentators on the issue. See
Jesse H. Choper, "On the Difference in Importance between Supreme Court
Doctrine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 19961997 Term," 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 2259, 2271 (1998).
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government action substantially burdens religious free exercise
rights, the government action can be upheld only by the
demonstration of a compelling state interest. And this test would
have to be applied to laws or actions that directly focused on
religious rights or to laws of general applicability that impacted
substantially m, such rights., It -was -that law, explicitly passed
pursuant to Congressional power under Section 5, which City of
Boerne examined.
In previous cases, the Court had held that Section 5 must be
interpreted as broadly as the Necessary and Proper clause.
By including Section 5, the draftsman sought to grant to
Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
The Court had noted that Congress may deem it necessary to add
specific statutory guarantees to the broad language of the rights
contained in Section 1 of the Amendment:
[i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged [by §5].
Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by
appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to
make the amendments fully effective. Id. at 648.
To eliminate any lingering doubt over the true intent of Section 5,
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court and citing the legislative
history of the Amendment, reasoned in Morgan:
[e]arlier drafts of the proposed Amendment employed the
"necessary and proper" terminology to describe the scope of
congressional

power

under

the

Amendment ...The

substitution of the "appropriate legislation" formula was
never thought to have the effect of diminishing the scope of
this congressional power. Id., fn. 9.
But as broad as this power may be, Congress cannot create new
constitutional rights in the guise of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court explained in Boerne:
Congress' power under § 5, however, extends only to
"enforc[ing]" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court has described this power as "remedial," South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 326, 86 S.Ct., at 817-18.
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are
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inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power
to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to
enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.
117 S.Ct. 2164.
The Court concluded that any remedy that Congress establishes to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
must be "proportionate" to the evil sought to be corrected:
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and
Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies,
the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law
support drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of
the Amendment. Id.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court added another prerequisite to
exercise of Congress' power under Section 5. Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that:
Following City of Boerne, we must first identify the
Fourteenth Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress
intended to remedy, guided by the principle that the propriety
of any §5 legislation 'must be judged with reference to the
historical experience ... it reflects.'"

With respect to the

problem of state infringement of patents, the Court noted that:
"In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.
B. Effect of City of Boerne and FloridaPrepaid
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The key issue under City of Boerne is whether Congress is simply
providing a proportionate remedy to the violation of a Constitutional
right already recognized by the Supreme Court or whether Congress
is attempting to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States." In addition, there must be
a showing that Congress was attempting to deal with a "pattern" of
unconstitutional action by the States, as required by Florida
Prepaid.
The issuO has arisen in a scattering of cases in the lower federal
courts. The Fourth Circuit has rejected the purported exercise of
Congressional power under Section 5 in two recent cases, Brown v.
North CarolinaDivision of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.
1999)(holding that federal regulations under the ADA prohibiting
states from charging for handicapped parking privileges were
unconstitutional and not a proper exercise of Congressional power
under Section 5) and Brozankala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute,
169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)(holding that the Violence against
Women Act was not validly enacted pursuant to Congress' Section 5
power).
In Brown, the Court found that the regulations under the ADA
which barred the requirement of payment for handicapped parking
was too much of an intrusion into the States' traditional power. The
Court noted:
Nor do the safeguards of federalism wither in the face of an
overzealous bureaucracy intent upon imposing its will on the
states. Regulations that unjustifiably intrude "into the States'
traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for
the health and welfare of their citizens," Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at
2171, are invalid exercises of power. Just as the Eleventh
Amendment does not leave states without a shield when they
confront congressional acts, states are not rendered
defenseless in their duels with government by bureaucracy.
166 F.3d at 704.
The Court noted:
Here, we hold that 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f), which prohibits a
state from charging even a modest fee to recover the costs of
its efforts to aid the handicapped, lies beyond the remedial
scope of the Section 5 power. As such, it is not a
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constitutionally valid exercise of power, and the effort to
abrogate must fail. Id. at 705.
Similarly, in the Brzonkala decision, the Court relied upon
generalized notions of federalism, noting "'the States' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and
welfare of their citizens.'" 169 F.3d at 851.
In both cases, the Fourth Circuit found that Congress' power to
legislate under Section 5 is disproportionate and a violation of the
Boerne restriction if it violates the States' traditional prerogatives
and general authority "to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens."
Most other Circuits have rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach.
Thus the Second Circuit recently upheld the validity of the Equal
Pay Act as a proper exercise of Congress' Section 5 power.
Finally, the EPA's provisions are not out of proportion to the
harms that Congress intended to remedy and deter... Since
the EPA provides an employer with four affirmative defenses,
including the ability to prove that the wage differential [is]
based on any other factor other than sex, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1)(iv), the EPA reaches only those wage disparities
for which the employee's sex provides the sole
explanation.... Thus, the statute is remedial legislation
reasonably tailored to remedy intentional gender-based wage
discrimination and is sufficiently limited in scope to satisfy the
City of Boerne test.
Anderson v. State University of New York, 169 F.3d 117, 121 (2d
Cir. 1999).
C. Congressional Response to City of Boerne.
Congress has limited options to meet the requirements of City of
Boerne. Once again, it can attempt to justify any remedial
legislation by making a careful legislative record of the problem
which the legislation is attempting to meet and why its legislation is
"proportionate" to the problem. While Congressional findings are
not conclusive on the federal courts, see Lopez, the normal
deference that federal courts afford to Congressional conclusions on
the need for legislation should go a long way to satisfying the rule.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The States' concern about restrictions being placed on them by
Congressional legislation can better be determined in the political
arena, where the States have ample power to express and defend
their positions, rather than by federal court decision. The New
Federalism presents an unnecessary barrier to the already difficult
process of enacting legislation on a national scale.
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[1] According to Justice Souter's dissent in Alden, the States
collectively employed
4,732,608 workers in 1997, see fn. 40, approximately 3.5% of the
total civilian work force in
the United States.
[2] [Get citation of Civil Right Committee report]
[3] The Association had filed a brief as Amicus curiae in Printz
urging that the background
check provision be upheld. See "The Brady Bill and the Tenth
Amendment," 52 The Record
(March, 1997).
[4] This is the conclusion reached by most commentators on the
issue. See Jesse H. Choper,
"On the Difference in Importance between Supreme Court Doctrine
and Actual Consequences: A
Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term," 19 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2259, 2271 (1998).
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